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Charalambos D. Charalambous, Themistoklis Charalambous and Christoforos N. Hadjicostis
Abstract— In this paper, we derive team and person-by-
person optimality conditions for distributed differential decision
systems with different or decentralized information structures.
The necessary conditions of optimality are given in terms of
Hamiltonian system of equations consisting of a coupled back-
ward and forward differential equations and a Hamiltonian
projected onto the subspace generated by the decentralized in-
formation structures. Under certain global convexity conditions
it is shown that the optimality conitions are also sufficient.
I. INTRODUCTION
When the system model consists of multiple decision mak-
ers, and the acquisition of information and its processing is
decentralized or shared among several locations, the decision
makers actions are based on different information. We call
the information available for such decisions, “decentralized
information structures or patterns”. When the system model
is dynamic, consisting of an interconnection of at least two
subsystems, and the decisions are based on decentralized
information structures, we call the overall system a “dis-
tributed system with decentralized information structures”.
Over the years several specific forms of decentralized
information structures are analyzed mostly in discrete-time
(see, for example [1], [2], [3], [4], [5] for the most recent
approaches). However, at this stage the systematic frame-
work addressing optimality conditions for distributed systems
with decentralized information structures is [6], [7], where
necessary and sufficient team game optimality conditions
are given for distributed stochastic differential systems with
decentralized information structures.
In this paper, we draw the corresponding results for
deterministic continuous- and discrete-time systems with
decentralized information structures. More specifically, we
consider a team game reward (e.g., [8], [9], [10]) and we
apply concepts from the classical theory of optimization
to derive necessary and sufficient optimality conditions for
nonlinear distributed systems with decentralized information
structures. The optimality conditions developed in this paper
can be applied to many architectures of distributed systems
(see, for example, Fig. 1). The specific contributions of this
paper are the following.
(a) Derive team games necessary and sufficient conditions of
optimality for distributed deterministic differential decision
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Fig. 1. Diagram of an example of the architecture for distributed decision
systems.
systems with decentralized information structures.
(b) Derive person-by-person optimality conditions and dis-
cuss their relation with team optimality conditions;
(c) Apply the optimality conditions to cetrain types of
differential team games.
In Section II the notation used throughout the paper is
provided, along with some background on team games and
information structures that is needed for our subsequent
development. In Section III, we first introduce the formu-
lation of the team and person-by-person decision problems
of differential systems, and then we derive the optimality
conditions. In Section IV, we compute the optimal strategies
for specific pay-off and differential structures and in Sec-
tion V, we provide the equivalent formulation for discrete-
time dynamical systems.
II. NOTATION AND PRELIMINARIES
The sets of real, integer and natural numbers are denoted
by R, Z and N, respectively; ZN
4
= {1, 2, . . . , N} and
Z0N
4
= {0, 1, 2, . . . , N}. The Borel algebra on [0, T ] is
denoted by B([0, T ]) and the linear transformation mapping
of a vector space X into a vector space Y is denoted by
L(X ,Y). 〈a, b〉 represents the inner product in Rn,∀a, b ∈
Rn for some positive integer n, whereas |a|Rn 4=
√〈a, b〉
is the norm on Rn,∀a ∈ Rn for some positive integer n.
H = M⊕M⊥ is a direct sum representation of a Hilbert
space H, where M is a closed subspace of H and M⊥ its
orthogonal complement. ΠM (x) is the orthogonal projection
of a Hilbert space element x ∈ H onto the subspace M ⊂ H.
Our derivations will make use of the following spaces.
C([0, T ],Rn) 4=
{
continuous functions φ : [0, T ] −→
Rn : supt∈[0,T ] |φ(t)|Rn < ∞
}
; B∞([0, T ],Rn) 4={
measurbale functions φ : [0, T ] −→ Rn : ||φ||2 4=
supt∈[0,T ] |φ(t)|2Rn < ∞
}
. For Lebesgue measurable func-
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tions φ we have the following spaces: L2([0, T ],Rn) 4={
φ : [0, T ] −→ Rn : ∫
[0,T ]
|z(t)|2Rndt < ∞
}
,
L2([0, T ],L(Rm,Rn)) 4=
{
φ : [0, T ] −→ Rn×m :∫
[0,T ]
|Σ(t)|2L(Rm,Rn)dt
4
=
∫
[0,T ]
tr(Σ∗(t)Σ(t))dt <∞
}
.
III. TEAM GAMES OF DIFFERENTIAL SYSTEMS
We first introduce the mathematical formulation of the
team and person-by-person (PbP) decision problems of dif-
ferential systems, and then we derive the optimality condi-
tions. We invoke decision maker (DM) strategies which are
deterministic measurable functions, also known as regular
strategies.
A. Elements of Team Games
The basic elements of a team game are the state space,
the observation space, the DMs action spaces, and the
pay-off. These are described below.
Unobserved State Space
The unobserved state space is assumed to be a linear com-
plete separable metric space (X[0,T ], d), where B(X[0,T ])
are the measurable subsets of the unobserved state space
X[0,T ] generated by open sets (with respect to metric d).
Elements x ∈ X[0,T ] are the unobserved state trajectories.
Since state trajectories are solutions of differential equations,
an envisioned scenario is X[0,T ] = C(0, T ],Rn), where
B(X[0,T ]) = B(C([0, T ],Rn)) is the σ−field generated
by cylinder sets in C([0, T ],Rn), and a state trajectory is
x
4
= {x(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} ∈ C([0, T ],Rn). We also introduce
σ−field generated by truncations of x ∈ C([0, T ],Rn)
defined by
Bt(C[0, T ],Rn)) 4= σ
{
{x ∈ C([0, T ],Rm) : x(s) ∈ A} :
0 ≤ s ≤ t, A ∈ B(Rn)
}
, t ∈ [0, T ]. (1)
Thus, {Bt(C[0, T ],Rn)) : t ∈ [0, T ]} is a family of σ−fields
which is nondecreasing,
Bs(C[0, T ],Rn)) ⊆ Bt(C[0, T ],Rn)), 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T . Thus,
for continuous trajectories the space C([0, T ],Rn) represent
the unobserved state space, and its elements the unobserved
state trajectories.
Observation Space
The observation space is assume to be a linear complete
separable metric space (Yi[0,T ], d
i), where B(Yi[0,T ]) are
its measurable subsets generated by open sets, for i =
1, . . . , N . Thus, elements y ∈ Yi[0,T ] represent the observable
trajectories. For unobserved state space C([0, T ],Rn), the
observable trajectories are generated by the maps
hi : [0, T ]× C([0, T ],Rn) −→Rki , yi(t) 4= hi(t, x),
i = 1, . . . N, (2)
such that {hi(t.x) : (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × C([0, T ],Rki)} have
the following property: for all t ∈ [0, T ], the map (s, x) →
hi(s, x) is B([0, t])⊗Bt(C[0, T ],Rn))/B(Rki)−measurable
for i = 1, . . . , N . When this propery holds we say,
{yi(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} is progressively measurable with
respect to the family {Bt(C[0, T ],Rki)) : t ∈ [0, T ]}.
Often we shall assume observation trajectories which are
square integrable yi ∈ L2([0, T ],Rki), and progressively
measurable with respect to {Bt(C[0, T ],Rki)) : t ∈ [0, T ]}.
Given an underlying Hilbert space Hi we denote by
Hyi0,t
4
= Span
{
yi(s) : 0 ≤ s ≤ t
}
the closed subspace
generated by {yi(s) : 0 ≤ s ≤ t} which is an element of the
Hilbert space (i.e., Hyi0,t ⊂ Hi), t ∈ [0, T ], for i = 1, . . . , N .
Note that the above constructions also embeds as a special
case observation trajectories which are independent of x, by
setting yi(t) = hi(t), hi : [0, T ] −→ Rki , for i = 1, . . . , N .
Team Members
The team is assumed to consist of N Decision Makers
(DM) or players whose actions {uit : t ∈ [0, T ]}, take
values in a closed convex set Ai of linear separable metric
space (Mi, di), i = 1, . . . , N . Unlike the centralized decision
making, each DMs i actions depends only on his own
observation space (Yi[0,T ], d). Let {Bt(Yi[0,T ]) : t ∈ [0, T ]}
denote the family of σ−fields generated by truncations of
yi ∈ Yi[0,T ], i = 1, . . . N . The set of admissible laws or
strategies of DM i, denoted by Uireg[0, T ], is defined by 1
Uireg[0, T ]
4
=
{
ui ∈ L2([0, T ],Rdi) : uit ∈ Ai ⊂ Rdi ,
t ∈ [0, T ], ui is {Bt(Yi[0,T ]) : t ∈ [0, T ]}
− progressively measurable
}
, ∀i ∈ ZN . (3)
Clearly, Uireg[0, T ] is a closed convex subset of
L2YiT
([0, T ],Rdi), for i = 1, 2, . . . , N . The set of admissible
N team or person-by-person strategies is denoted by
U(N)reg [0, T ]
4
= ×Ni=1Uireg[0, T ].
The DM actions {uit : t ∈ [0, T ]} are called:
Open Loop (OL), if uit = µi(t), for t ∈ [0, T ], where
µi : [0, T ] −→ Ai are deterministic measurable functions,
i = 1, . . . , N ;
Closed Loop Feedback (CLF), if uit = µi(t, yi) are nonan-
ticipative functionals of the observation trajectory yi(·),
for t ∈ [0, T ], where µi : [0, T ] × Yii[0,T ] −→ Ai, are
deterministic measurable mappings, i = 1, . . . , N ;
Closed Loop Markov (CLM), if uit = µi(t, yi(t)), for
t ∈ [0, T ], where µi : [0, T ]× Rki −→ Ai, are deterministic
measurable functions, i = 1, . . . , N .
Clearly, open loop strategies can be described via
observations {yi(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} which belong to
closed subspaces generated by finite number of basis,
Hyi0,t
4
= Span
{
e11, e
i
2, . . . , e
i
ji
}
of a Hilbert space
Hi0,t, t ∈ [0, T ], for i = 1, . . . , N .
Distributed Differential System
A distributed differential system consists of an interconnec-
1We often write L2Yi
T
([0, T ],Rdi ) ≡ L2([0, T ],Rdi ) to indicate that its
elements are {Bt(Yi[0,T ]) : t ∈ [0, T ]}−progressively measurable.
tion of N subsystems. Each subsystem i has its own state
vector Rni , action space Ai ⊂ Rdi , and an initial state vector
xi(0) = xi0, described by a system of coupled differential
equations as follows.
x˙i(t) = f i(t, xi(t), uit) +
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
f ij(t, xj(t), ujt ) ,
xi(0) = xi0, t ∈ (0, T ], i ∈ ZN . (4)
Define the augmented vectors by
u
4
= (u1, u2, . . . , uN ) ∈ Rd, x 4= (x1, x2, . . . , xN ) ∈ Rn.
In compact form the distributed differential system is de-
scribed by
x˙(t) = f(t, x(t), ut), x(0) = x0, t ∈ (0, T ], (5)
where f : [0, T ] × Rn × A(N) −→ Rn. Note that (5) is
very general since no specific interconnection structure is
assumed among the different subsystems.
Pay-off Functional
Consider the distributed system (5) with a given admissible
set of DMs strategies. Given a u ∈ U(N)reg [0, T ], we define
the reward or performance criterion by
J(u1, . . . , uN )
4
=
∫ T
0
`(t, x(t), ut)dt+ ϕ(x(T ), (6)
where ` : [0, T ] × Rn × U(N) −→ (−∞,∞] and
ϕ : Rn −→ (−∞,∞]. Notice that the performance of
the decentralized system is measured by a single pay-off
functional. The underlying assumption concerning the single
pay-off instead of multiple pay-offs (one for each decision
maker) is that the team objective can be met.
Team and Person-by-Person Optimality
Given the basic elements of the team game introduce
above, we now introduce the definitions of team and
Person-by-Person (PbP) or (player-by-player) optimality.
Problem 1: (Team and Person-by-Person Optimality)
(T): Team Optimality. Given the pay-off functional
(6), constraint (5) the N tuple of strategies uo
4
=
(u1,o, u2,o, . . . , uN,o) ∈ U(N)reg [0, T ] is called team optimal
if it satisfies
J(u1,o, u2,o, . . . , uN,o) ≤ J(u1, u2, . . . , uN ), (7)
for all u
4
= (u1, u2, . . . , uN ) ∈ U(N)reg [0, T ]. Any uo ∈
U(N)rel [0, T ] satisfying (7) is called an optimal regular de-
cision strategy (or control) and the corresponding xo(·) ≡
x(·;uo(·)) (satisfying (5)) the optimal state process.
(PbP): Person-by-Person Optimality. Given the pay-off
functional (6), constraint (5) the N tuple of strategies
uo
4
= (u1,o, u2,o, . . . , uN,o) ∈ U(N)reg [0, T ] is called person-
by-person optimal if it satisfies
J˜(ui,o, u−i,o) = J(uo) ≤ J˜(ui, u−i,o), (8)
for all ui ∈ Uireg[0, T ], ∀i ∈ ZN , where
J˜(v, u−i)
4
= J(u1, u2, . . . , ui−1, v, ui+1, . . . , uN ).
Conditions (8) are analogous to the Nash equilibrium
strategies of team games consisting of a single pay-off and N
DM. The rationale for the restriction to PbP optimal strategy
is based on the fact that the actions of the N DM are not
communicated to each other, and hence they cannot do better
than restricting attention to this optimal strategy.
B. Existence of Solutions and Continuous Dependence
Herein, we study the question of existence of solutions
to (5) and its continuous dependence on the DM strategies
based on the following assumptions.
Assumptions 1: The drift f associated with (5) is a Borel
measurable map defined by
f : [0, T ]× Rn × A(N) −→ Rn,
and there exists a K ∈ L2,+([0, T ],R) such that
(A1) |f(t, x, u) − f(t, y, u)|Rn ≤ K(t)|x − y|Rn uniformly
in u ∈ A(N);
(A2) |f(t, x, u) − f(t, x, v)|Rn ≤ K(t)|u − v|Rd uniformly
in x ∈ Rn;
(A3) |f(t, x, u)|Rn ≤ K(t)(1 + |x|Rn + |u|Rd).
Assumptions 1 are sufficient conditions for the existence
of a unique C([0, T ],Rn) solution which is also an element
of the space B∞([0, T ],Rn).
The following lemma establishes such results and continuous
dependence of solutions on the DM strategies.
Lemma 1: Suppose Assumptions 1 hold. Then for any u ∈
U(N)reg [0, T ], the following hold.
1) System (5) has a unique solution x ∈ B∞([0, T ],Rn)
which is continuous x ∈ C([0, T ],Rn).
2) The solution of system (5) is continuously dependent on
the DM strategies, in the sense that, as ui,α −→ ui,o in
Uireg[0, T ], ∀i ∈ ZN , xα −→ xo in B∞([0, T ],Rn).
Proof: Similar to [6, Lemma 1].
C. Team and PbP Optimality Conditions
For the derivation of optimality conditions we shall require
stronger regularity conditions for f , as well as, for the
running and terminal pay-offs functions {`, ϕ}. These are
given below.
Assumptions 2: The maps of {f, `, ϕ} satisfy the follow-
ing conditions.
(B1) The map f : [0, T ]×Rn×A(N) −→ Rn is continuous in
(t, x, u) and continously differentiable with respect to x, u;
(B2) The first derivatives of {fx, fu} are bounded uniformly
on [0, T ]× Rn × A(N).
(B3) The maps ` : [0, T ] × Rn × A(N) −→ (−∞,∞] is
Borel measurable, continuously differentiable with respect to
(x, u), the map ϕ : [0, T ]×Rn −→ (−∞,∞] is continously
differentiable with respect to x, `(0, 0, t) is bounded, and
there exist K1,K2 > 0 such that
|`x(t, x, u)|Rn + |`u(t, x, u)|Rd ≤ K1
(
1 + |x|Rn + |u|Rd
)
,
|ϕx(x)|Rn ≤ K2
(
1 + |x|Rn
)
.
(B4) |hi(t, x)|Rki ≤ K sup0≤s≤t
(
1 + |x(s)|2Rn
)
,∀t ∈
[0, T ], x ∈ C([0, T ],Rn), i = 1, . . . , N .
Note that (B1), (B2) imply that |f(t, x, u)|Rn ≤
K
(
1 + |x|Rn + |u|Rd
)
,K > 0, and (B4) implies
hi ∈ B∞([0, T ],Rn), i = 1, . . . , N .
First, we derive necessary conditions for team and PbP
optimality. For this derivation, we need the so-called vari-
ational equation. We note that for differential systems, the
strategies can be either open-loop or feedback, and feedback
strategies do not give smaller pay-off. Thus, the minimum
pay-off attainable under open loop strategies is equal to the
minimum pay-off attainable under feedback strategies. This
is well known in deterministic optimal control theory. The
point to be made is that when considering variations in the
state trajectory the DM strategies do not react so we do not
need to introduce derivatives of the u variable with respect
to the state.
Suppose uo
4
= (u1,o, u2,o, . . . , uN,o) ∈ U(N)rel [0, T ] denotes
the optimal decision and u
4
= (u1, u2, . . . , uN ) ∈ U(N)rel [0, T ]
any other decision. Since Ai is convex then Uireg[0, T ] is
convex ∀i ∈ ZN , it is clear that for any ε ∈ [0, 1],
ui,εt
4
= ui,ot + ε(u
i
t − ui,ot ) ∈ Uireg[0, T ], ∀i ∈ ZN .
Let xε(·) ≡ xε(·;uε(·)) and xo(·) ≡ xo(·;uo(·)) ∈
B∞([0, T ],Rn) denote the solutions of the system equation
(5) corresponding to uε(·) and uo(·), respectively. Consider
the limit
Z(t)
4
= lim
ε↓0
1
ε
{
xε(t)− xo(t)
}
, t ∈ [0, T ]. (9)
We have the following result characterizing the variational
equation.
Lemma 2: Suppose Assumptions 2 hold and consider
strategies U(N)reg [0, T ]. The process {Z(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} defined
by (9) is an element of the Banach space B∞([0, T ],Rn)
and it is the unique solution of the variational differential
equation
Z˙(t) =fx(t, x
o(t), uot )Z(t) (10)
+
N∑
i=1
fui(t, x
o(t), u,ot )(u
i
t − ui,ot ), Z(0) = 0.
having trajectories Z ∈ C([0, T ],Rn).
Proof: Similar to [6, Lemma 2].
Before we show the optimality conditions we define the
Hamiltonian system of equations, i.e.,
H : [0, T ]× Rn × Rn × A(N) −→ R
given by
H(t, x, ψ, u)
4
= 〈f(t, x, u), ψ〉+ `(t, x, u), t ∈ [0, T ].
(11)
For any u ∈ U(N)reg [0, T ], the adjoint process ψ ∈
L2([0, T ],Rn) satisfies the following backward differential
equation
ψ˙(t) =− f∗x(t, x(t), ut)ψ(t)− `x(t, x(t), ut)
=−Hx(t, x(t), ψ(t), ut), t ∈ [0, T ). (12a)
ψ(T ) =ϕx(x(T )). (12b)
In terms of the Hamiltonian, the state process satisfies the
differential equation
x˙(t) =f(t, x(t), ut) = Hψ(t, x(t), ψ(t), ut), t ∈ (0, T ]
x(0) =x0.
Next, we state and prove the necessary conditions for team
optimality. Specifically, given that uo ∈ U(N)reg [0, T ] is team
optimal, we show that it leads naturally to the Hamiltonian
system of equations (called necessary conditions).
Theorem 1 (Necessary conditions for team optimality):
Consider Problem 1 under Assumptions 2, and assume
Ai are closed, bounded and convex subsets of Rdi , and
{yi(s) : 0 ≤ s ≤ t} generates Hyi0,t-a closed subspace of a
Hilbert space for i = 1, . . . , N .
For an element uo ∈ U(N)reg [0, T ] with the corresponding
solution xo ∈ B∞([0, T ],Rn) to be team optimal, it is
necessary that the following conditions hold.
1) There exists a process ψo ∈ L2([0, T ],Rn).
2) The triple {uo, xo, ψo} satisfy the inequality:
N∑
i=1
∫ T
0
〈Hui(t, xo(t)ψo(t), uot ), uit − ui,ot 〉dt ≥ 0,
∀u ∈ U(N)reg [0, T ]. (13)
3) The process ψo is the unique C([0, T ],Rn) solution of
the backward differential equation (12a), (12b) and uo ∈
U(N)reg [0, T ] satisfies the inequalities:
〈ΠHyi0,t
(
Hui(t, x
o(t), ψo(t), uot )
)
, vi − ui,ot 〉 ≥ 0,
∀vi ∈ Ai, t ∈ [0, T ], i = 1, 2, . . . , N. (14)
Proof: For 1) and 2), this is similar to [6, Theorem 6].
For 3), consider
{
Hui(t, x
o, ψo(t), uot ) : t ∈ [0, T ]
}
lying
in the Hilbert space of square integrable functions Hi, i =
1, . . . , N , and the set of observables {yi(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]}
generating a closed subspace Hyi0,t
4
= Span
{
yi(s) : 0 ≤ s ≤
t
}
⊂ Hi, i ∈ ZN . Then for any Hui ∈ Hi we have the
decomposition
Hui(t, x
o(t), ψo(t), uot )
= ΠHyi0,t
(
Hui(t, x
o(t), ψo(t), uot )
)
+ E(t),
E(t) ⊥ Hyi0,t, t ∈ [0, T ], i ∈ ZN .
Since ut − uit ∈ Hy
i
0,t, by substituting the above decomposi-
tion in (13) we obtain
N∑
i=1
∫ T
0
〈ΠHyi0,t
(
H(t, xo(t), ψo(t), uot )
)
,
uit − ui,ot 〉dt ≥ 0, ∀u ∈ U(N)reg [0, T ]. (15)
Let t ∈ (0, T ), and ε > 0, and consider the set Iε ≡ [t, t +
ε] ⊂ [0, T ] such that |Iε| → 0 as ε→ 0, for i = 1, 2, . . . , N .
For any Hyi0,t−progressively measurable vit ∈ Ai, construct
uit =
{
vit for t ∈ Iε
ui,ot otherwise
i = 1, 2, . . . , N. (16)
Clearly, it follows from the above construction that ui ∈
Uireg[0, T ]. Substituting (16) in (15) we obtain the following
inequality
N∑
i=1
∫
Iε
〈ΠHyi0,t
(
Hui(t, x
o(t), ψo(t), uot )
)
, vit − ui,ot )〉dt
≥ 0, ∀vit ∈ Ai, i = 1, 2, . . . , N. (17)
Letting |Iε| denote the Lebesgue measure of the set Iε and
dividing the above expression by |Iε| and letting ε → 0 we
arrive at the following inequality.
N∑
i=1
〈ΠHyi0,t
(
Hui(t, xo(t), ψo(t), uot
)
, vit − ui,ot 〉 ≥ 0,
∀vit ∈ Ai, t ∈ [0, T ], , i = 1, 2, . . . , N. (18)
To complete the proof of 3) for a given vi ∈ Ai (determin-
istic) define
gi(t)
4
= 〈ΠHyi0,t
(
Hui(t, xo(t), ψo(t), uot
)
, vi − ui,ot 〉,
t ∈ [0, T ], , i = 1, 2, . . . , N. (19)
Then gi(t) ∈ Hyi0,t. We shall show that
gi(t) ≥ 0, ∀vi ∈ Ai, t ∈ [0, T ], ∀i ∈ ZN . (20)
Suppose for some i ∈ ZN , (20) does not hold, and let Ai 4=
{t : gi(t) < 0}. Since gi(t) ∈ Hyi0,t, ∀t ∈ [0, T ] we can
choose vit in (18) as
vit
4
=
{
v on Ai
ui,ot outsideA
i
together with vjt = u
j,o
t , j 6= i, j ∈ ZN . Substituting this in
(15) (with uit = v
i
t) we arrive at
∫
Ai
gi(t)dt ≥ 0, which
contradicts the definition of Ai, unless Ai has Lebesgue
measure zero. Hence, (20) holds which is precisely (14).
This completes the derivation.
Next, we show that the necessary conditions of optimality
(14) are also sufficient under certain convexity conditions.
Theorem 2 (Sufficient conditions for team optimality):
Consider Problem 1 under the conditions of Theorem 1, and
let (uo(·), xo(·)) denote any control-state pair (decision-
state) and let ψo(·) the corresponding adjoint processes.
Suppose the following conditions hold:
C1 H(t, ·, x, u), t ∈ [0, T ] is convex in (x, u) ∈ Rn ×A(N);
C2 ϕ(·) is convex in x ∈ Rn.
Then (uo(·), xo(·)) is team optimal if it satisfies (14). In
other words, necessary conditions are also sufficient.
Proof: Let uo ∈ U(N)reg [0, T ] denote a candidate for
the optimal team decision and u ∈ U(N)reg [0, T ] any other
decision. Then,
J(uo)− J(u) =
∫ T
0
{
`(t, xo(t), uot )− `(t, x(t), ut)
}
dt
+
(
ϕ(xo(T ))− ϕ(x(T ))
)
. (21)
By the convexity of ϕ(·), we have
ϕ(x(T ))− ϕ(xo(T )) ≥ 〈ϕx(xo(T )), x(T )− xo(T )〉. (22)
Substituting (22) into (21) yields
J(uo)− J(u) ≤〈ϕx(xo(T )), xo(T )− x(T )〉
+
∫ T
0
(
`(t, xo(t), uot )− `(t, x(t), ut)
)
dt.
(23)
Applying the differential rule to 〈ψo, x−xo〉 on the interval
[0, T ] we obtain the following equation.
〈ψo(T ), x(T )− xo(T )〉
=〈ψo(0), x(0)− xo(0)〉
+
∫ T
0
〈−f∗x(t, xo(t), uot )ψo(t)dt
− `x(t, xo(t), uot ), x(t)− xo(t)〉dt
+
∫ T
0
〈ψo(t), f(t, x(t), ut)− f(t, xo(t), uot )〉dt
=−
∫ T
0
〈Hx(t, xo(t), ψo(t), uot ), x(t)− xo(t)〉dt
+
∫ T
0
〈ψo(t), f(t, x(t), ut)− f(t, xo(t), uot )〉dt.
(24)
Note that ψo(T ) = ϕx(xo(T )). Substituting (24) into (23)
we obtain
J(uo)− J(u) ≤
∫ T
0
(
H(t, xo(t), ψo(t), uot )
−H(t, x(t), ψo(t), ut)
)
dt
−
∫ T
0
〈Hx(t, xo(t), ψo(t), uot ), xo(t)− x(t)〉dt.
(25)
By hypothesis of convexity of H in (x, u) ∈ Rn × A(N),
then (25) reduces to
J(uo)− J(u)
≤
N∑
i=1
∫ T
0
< Hui(t, x
o(t), ψo(t), uot ), u
i,o
t − uit > dt
=
N∑
i=1
∫ T
0
< ΠHyi0,t
(
Hui(t, x
o(t), ψo(t), uot )
)
, ui,ot − uit > dt
≤ 0, ∀u ∈ U(N)reg [0, T ], (26)
where the last inequality follows from (14). This proves
that uo optimal and hence the necessary conditions are also
sufficient.
Under the conditions of Theorem 1, it can be shown
that the necessary conditions for team optimality and PbP
optimality are equivalent. Moreover, under the conditions of
Theorem 2 it can be shown that PbP optimality implies team
optimality. We state the results as a corollary.
Corollary 1: (Necessary and sufficient conditions for
PbP optimality). Consider the PbP optimality of Problem 1
under the conditions of Theorem 1, 2.
The necessary and sufficient conditions for PbP optimality
of (uo(·), xo(·)) are those of team optimality given in The-
orems 1, 2 with the variational inequality (13) replaced by∫ T
0
〈ΠHyi0,t
(
Hui(t, x
o(t), ψo(t), uot )
)
, uit − ui,ot 〉dt ≥ 0,
∀ui ∈ Uireg[0, T ], ∀i ∈ ZN . (27)
Proof: Similar to that of Theorems 1 and 2.
We conclude this section by stating that the team opti-
mality conditions, Pontryagin’s maximum principle are ob-
tained following the classical theory of deterministic optimal
control with centralized strategies. The only variation is
the characterization of the optimal strategies described by
the projection of the Hamiltonian onto the Hilbert space
closed subspace generated by the observables (on which the
different DM actions are based on). Consequently, we state
following observations.
(O1): By considering spike or needle variations, condition,
the derivatives of f and ` w.r.t. u can be removed and
replaced by f, `, ϕ that are twice differentiable in x ∈
Rn, having first partial derivatives which are measurable
in t ∈ [0, T ] and continuous with respect to the rest of
the arguments, and second partial derivatives which are
uniformly bounded.
(O2): The team and PbP optimality conditions of Theorem 1,
2 are based on the assumption that Ai, i = 1, . . . , N are
convex. We can consider relaxed strategies, that is, controls
which are conditional distributions, uit(dξ|{yi(s) : 0 ≤
s ≤ t}), i = 1, . . . , N , and remove the assumptions on the
differentiability of f, ` with respect to u, and instead assume
Ai, i = 1, . . . , N are compact subsets of finite-dimensional
spaces. Based on this relaxed strategies formulation we can
show existence of optimal strategies utilizing appropriate
weak∗ topologies. Such relaxed strategies are important when
the DM actions are based on a finite number of points, such
as, Ai = {−1,+1} which is not a convex set.
(O3): The team and PbP optimality conditions of Theorem 1,
2 can be generalized to include pointwise and integral
constraints, of x, u involving inequalities and equalities.
Moreover, the terminal time can be free laying on a manifold,
and hence subject to optimization rather than been fixed T .
Such problems are extensively investigated in the theory of
optimal control. Some of these problems can be transformed
into the team and PbP problems investigated earlier, by
augmenting the Hamiltonian, and motifying the boundary
conditions.
IV. EXAMPLES
In this section, we give examples for two team games with
special structures, namely, Generalized Normal Form (GNF)
and Linear Quadratic Form (LQF).
A. Generalized Normal Form (GNF)
Definition 1 (Generalized Normal Form): The game is
said to have “general normal form” if
f(t, x, u)
4
=b(t, x) + g(t, x)u,
g(t, x)u
4
=
N∑
j=1
g(j)(t, x)uj ,
`(t, x, u)
4
=
1
2
〈u,R(t, x)u〉+ 1
2
λ(t, x) + 〈u, η(t, x)〉,
where
〈u,R(t, x)u〉 4=
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
ui,∗Rij(t, x)uj ,
〈u, η(t, x)〉 4=
N∑
i=1
ui,∗ηi(t, x),
and R(·, ·) is symmetric uniformly positive definite, and
λ(·, ·) is uniformly positive semidefinite.
GNF refers to the case when the drift coefficient f is
linear with respect to (w.r.t.) the decision variable u, and
the pay-off function ` is quadratic in u, while f, `, ϕ are
nonlinear with respect to x.
By the definition of Hamiltonian (11), its derivative is given
by
Hu(t, x, ψ,Q, u) =g∗(t, x)ψ +R(t, x)u+ η(t, x),
(t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn.
By Theorem 1, utilizing the fact that ui,ot ∈ Hy
i
0,t for each
i ∈ ZN , the explicit expression for ui,ot is given by
ui,ot =−
{
ΠHyi0,t
(
Rii(t, x
o(t), ψox(t))
)}−1
{
ΠHyi0,t
(
ηi(t, xo(t))
)
+
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
ΠHyi0,t
(
Rij(t, x
o(t))uj,ot
)
+ΠHyi0,t
(
g(i),∗(t, x)ψo(t)
)}
, i = 1, 2, . . . , N.
B. Linear Quadratic Form (LQF)
Definition 2 (Quadratic Form): The game is said to have
“linear quadratic form” if
f(t, x, u) =A(t)x+ b(t) +B(t)u, (28a)
`(t, x) =
1
2
〈u,R(t)u〉+ 1
2
〈x,H(t)x〉+ 〈x, F (t)〉
+ 〈u,E(t)x〉+ 〈u,m(t)〉, (28b)
ϕ(x) =
1
2
〈x,M(T )x〉+ 〈x,N(T )〉, (28c)
and R(·) is symmetric uniformly positive definite, H(·) is
symmetric uniformly positive semidefinite, and M(T ) is
symmetric positive semidefinite.
From the optimal strategies under LQF, one obtains for i =
1, 2, . . . , N :
ui,ot = −
{
Rii(t)
}−1{
mi(t) +
N∑
j=1
Eij(t)ΠHyi0,t
(
xj,o(t)
)
+
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
RijΠHyi0,t
(
uj,ot
)
+B(i),∗(t)ΠHyi0,t
(
ψo(t)
)}
.
Note that the previous equations can be put in the form of
fixed point matrix equation.
1) Team games of Linear Quadratic Form - Explicit
Expressions of Adjoint Processes: This is a necessary step
before one proceeds with the computation of the explicit
form of the optimal decentralized strategies, or the compu-
tation of them via fixed point methods. For a game of LQF,
let (xo(·), ψo(·)) denote the solutions of the Hamiltonian
system, corresponding to the optimal control uo, then
d
dt
xo(t) = A(t)xo(t) + b(t) +B(t)uot , x
o(0) = x0,
(29)
d
dt
ψo(t) = −A∗(t)ψo(t)−H(t)xo(t)− F (t)− E∗(t)uot ,
ψo(T ) = M(T )xo(T ) +N(T ), (30)
Next, we find the form of the solution of the adjoint equation
(30). Let {Φ(t, s) : 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T} denote the
transition operator of A(·) and Φ∗(·, ·) that of the adjoint
A∗(·) of A(·). Then we have the identity ∂∂sΦ∗(t, s) =−A∗(s)Φ∗(t, s), 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T . One can verify by
differentiation that the solution {ψo(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} of (30),
is given by
ψo(t) = Φ∗(T, t)M(T )xo(T ) +N(T )+∫ T
t
Φ∗(s, t)
{
H(s)xo(s)ds+ F (s)ds+ E∗(s)uos
}
ds
(31)
Since for any control policy, {xo(s) : 0 ≤ t ≤ s ≤ T} is
uniquely determined from (29) and its current value xo(t),
then (31) can be expressed via
ψo(t) = Σ(t)xo(t) + βo(t), t ∈ [0, T ], (32)
where Σ(·), βo(·) determine the operators to the one ex-
pressed via (31).
Next, we determine the operators (Σ(·), βo(·)). Differentiat-
ing both sides of (32) and using (29), (30) yields
Σ˙(t) +A∗(t)Σ(t) + Σ(t)A(t) +H(t) = 0,
Σ(T ) = M(T ), (33)
β˙o(t) +A∗(t)βo(t) + Σ(t)b(t) + F (t) + Σ(t)B(t)uot
+ E∗(t)uot = 0, β
o(T ) = N(T ). (34)
Decentralized Information Structures
Here, we invoke the minimum principle to compute the
optimal strategies for team games of LQF. Without loss of
generality we assume the distributed dynamical decision sys-
tems consists of an interconnection of two subsystems, each
governed by a linear differential equation with coupling. This
can be generalized to an arbitrary number of interconnected
subsystems.
Consider the distributed dynamics described below.
Subsystem Dynamics 1:
d
dt
x1(t) = A11(t)x
1(t) +B11(t)u
1
t +A12(t)x
2(t)
+B12(t)u
2
t , x
1(0) = x10, t ∈ (0, T ], (35)
Subsystem Dynamics 2:
d
dt
x2(t) = A22(t)x
2(t) +B22(t)u
2
t +A21(t)x
1(t)
+B21u
1
t , x
2(0) = x20, t ∈ (0, T ]. (36)
Pay-off Functional:
J(u1, u2) =
1
2
{∫ T
0
[
〈
(
x1(t)
x2(t)
)
, H(t)
(
x1(t)
x2(t)
)
〉
+ 〈
(
u1t
u2t
)
, R(t)
(
u1t
u2t
)
〉
]
dt
+ 〈
(
x1(T )
x2(T )
)
,M(T )
(
x1(T )
x2(T )
)
〉
}
. (37)
Define the augmented variables by
x
4
=
(
x1
x2
)
, u
4
=
(
u1
u2
)
, ψ
4
=
(
ψ1
ψ2
)
, (38)
and matrices by
A
4
=
[
A11 A12
A21 A22
]
, B
4
=
[
B11 B12
B21 B22
]
,
B(1)
4
=
[
B11
B21
]
, B(2)
4
=
[
B12
B22
]
.
Let
(
xo(·), ψo(·)) denote the solutions of the Hamiltonian
system, corresponding to the optimal control uo, then
d
dt
xo(t) =A(t)xo(t) +B(t)uot , x
o(0) = x0, (39a)
d
dt
ψo(t) =−A∗(t)ψo(t)−H(t)xo(t),
ψo(T ) = M(T )xo(T ), (39b)
ψo(t) =Σ(t)xo(t) + βo(t), (39c)
where Σ(·), βo(·) are given by (33), (34) with b, F,E = 0.
The optimal decisions {(u1,ot , u2,ot ) : 0 ≤ t ≤ T} are given
by
ΠHyi0,t
(
Hu1(t, x1,o(t),x2,o(t), ψ1,o(t), ψ2,o(t), u1,ot ,
u2,0t )
)
= 0, t ∈ [0, T ]. (40a)
ΠHyi0,t
(
Hu2(t, x1,o(t),x2,o(t), ψ1,o(t), ψ2,o(t), u1,ot ,
u2,0t )
)
= 0, t ∈ [0, T ]. (40b)
From (40a), (40b) the optimal decisions for t ∈ [0, T ] are
given by
u1,ot =−R−111 (t)B(1),∗(t)ΠHy10,t
(
ψo(t)
)
−R−111 (t)R12(t)ΠHy10,t
(
u2,ot
)
, (41a)
u2,ot =−R−122 (t)B(2),∗(t)ΠHy20,t
(
ψo(t)
)
−R−122 (t)R21(t)ΠHy20,t
(
u1,ot
)
. (41b)
One can proceed further to utilize the solution for ψo(·) to
express the projections in (41a), (41b) into projections of the
state xo(·) onto the subspaces Hyi0,t, i = 1, 2, and then find
the equations governing these projections. This procedure is
lenghty and hence it is omitted.
V. DISCRETE-TIME DYNAMICAL SYSTEMS
By either discretizing the continuous-time system (or con-
sidering the discrete-time analog), we have the Hamiltonian
at each time step k given by
H(k, x, ψ, u) 4= 〈f(k, x, u), ψ(k + 1)〉+ `(k, x, u),
where k ∈ Z0T−1 and T is a positive integer. Note that the
adjoint is one step ahead of the other terms. In terms of
the Hamiltonian, the state process satisfies the differential
equation
x(k + 1) = f(k, x(k), uk)
= Hψ(k, x(k), ψ(k + 1), uk), k ∈ Z0T−1 (42a)
x(0) = x0. (42b)
For any u ∈ U(N)reg [0, T ], the adjoint process is ψ ∈
`2([0, T ],Rn) satisfies the following backward differential
equation
ψ(k) = −Hx(k, x(k), ψ(k + 1), uk), k ∈ Z0T−1. (43a)
ψ(T ) = ϕx(x(T )). (43b)
The process ψo is the unique solution of the backward
difference equation (43a), (43b) and uo ∈ U(N)reg [0, T ] satisfies
the inequalities:
〈ΠHyi0,k
(
Hui(k, x
o(k), ψo(k + 1), uok)
)
, vi − ui,ok 〉 ≥ 0,
∀vi ∈ Ai, k ∈ [0, T ], i = 1, 2, . . . , N. (44)
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we have considered team games for dis-
tributed decision systems, with decentralized information
patterns for each DM. Necessary and sufficient optimality
conditions with respect to team optimality and PbP opti-
mality criteria are derived, based on Pontryagin’s maximum
principle. The methodology is very general, and applicable
to many areas. However, several additional issues remain to
be investigated. Below, we provide a short list.
(F1) The derivation of optimality conditions can be used
in other type of games such as Nash-equilibrium games
with decentralized information structures for each DM, and
minimax games of robust control.
(F2) The methodology can be extended to deal with exoge-
nous inputs in the state dynamics and the measurements,
by assuming these belong to L2 or `2 spaces. For dis-
tributed systems of control of linear quadratic form, with
decentralized information structures, one may also invoke
the minimax formulation found in [11] which invokes Krein
spaces, instead of Hilbert spaces.
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